06__ROSENBERG.DOC

4/16/2008 8:37:21 AM

THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF THE
IRRELEVANCE-OF-MOTIVE MAXIM
MICHAEL T. ROSENBERG†
ABSTRACT
The irrelevance-of-motive maxim—the longstanding principle that
a defendant’s motives are irrelevant to criminal liability—has come
under attack. Critics of this maxim claim that “motives,” under any
plausible conception of the term, are in fact relevant in the criminal
law. According to these critics, the only way to defend the truth of the
irrelevance-of-motive maxim is to render it true by definition, by
defining motive as the subcategory of intentions that are irrelevant to
criminal liability. This Note defends the irrelevance-of-motive maxim
by applying a plausible conception of “motive” that conforms to the
historical meaning of the term. With the proper definition in place, the
irrelevance-of-motive maxim can be understood as stating a valid
principle of criminal law, defied only by the advent of a certain kind
of bias crime legislation.

INTRODUCTION
“[A]lthough a good motive might mitigate punishment (or
[discourage] prosecution), and a bad motive might aggravate
punishment (or [encourage] prosecution), it is a truism within
orthodoxy that motive has no bearing on liability itself.”1 According
to Professor Jerome Hall, “hardly any part of penal law is more
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1. DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 144 (1987) (altered to correct
the source’s transposition of the words “encourage” and “discourage”).
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2
definitely settled than that motive is irrelevant.” The “irrelevance-of3
motive maxim” —the claim that one’s motives are irrelevant to
criminal liability—has received increasing attention in light of the
4
modern debate over hate crime, or bias crime, legislation. For
example, the Wisconsin and Ohio Supreme Courts both cited the
irrelevance-of-motive maxim to support their decisions, later reversed
by the United States Supreme Court, to strike down bias crime
statutes as unconstitutional.5 Yet despite judicial reliance on this
maxim, and despite Professor Hall’s characterization of it as an
unquestioned principle of law, the irrelevance-of-motive maxim has
come under attack6 from normative, empirical, and logical criticisms.7
The normative criticisms ask why motive should be irrelevant to
criminal liability, in light of motive’s relevance to questions of moral
8
culpability. The empirical criticisms assert that motive is relevant to
9
criminal liability, and even when irrelevant to liability itself, that
motive nevertheless exerts a more subtle influence, affecting how
prosecutors,10 judges,11 and juries12 apply the law. The logical criticisms

2. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 88 (2d ed. 1960) (emphasis
added) (citing State v. Logan, 126 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1939) (per curiam)).
3. Although the phrase “irrelevance-of-motive maxim” is used consistently throughout
this Note, there is no generally agreed upon description of this principle. This phrase, sans
hyphens, was used by Professor Guyora Binder in his article The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent,
6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1 passim (2002).
4. The term “bias crime” is used throughout this Note instead of “hate crime” because
those who commit bias crimes do not necessarily hate their victims. See FREDERICK M.
LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE 9 (1999) (defending the term “bias crime” for this reason). For a
discussion on the distinction between statutes that require a racial animus and those that merely
require differential selection of victims of a particular group, see infra Part III.B.3.
5. See State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 452–56 (Ohio 1992) (invalidating a bias crime
statute because it wrongly punished motive), vacated, 508 U.S. 969 (1993) (mem.); State v.
Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 813 & n.11–12 (Wis. 1992) (discussing the distinction between motive
and intention to show that the statute improperly concerns motive), rev’d, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
6. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L.
REV. 89, 90 (2006) (“[T]his familiar law school picture of motive as essentially irrelevant is
increasingly wrong descriptively and is also wrong normatively.”).
7. Binder, supra note 3, at 45.
8. See HUSAK, supra note 1, at 144 (“Nothing written by moral philosophers supports the
unimportance of motive.”).
9. See, e.g., id. at 146 (“The reason why the defendant breaks and enters is crucial in
characterizing his conduct as a burglary. Forgery, kidnapping, criminal libel, and conspiracy
provide other examples, and the list could be expanded at great length.”).
10. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT JR., CRIMINAL LAW 231 (2d ed. 1986)
(asserting that motive is relevant to the procedural aspects of criminal law).
11. See Antony Duff, Principle and Contradiction in the Criminal Law: Motives and
Criminal Liability, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 156, 171 (Antony Duff ed., 1998)
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of the maxim question the coherence of proposed distinctions
between motives and intentions, and seek to prevent defenders of the
13
maxim from rendering it true by definition.
Taken together, the logical and empirical criticisms contend that
“no distinction could be drawn between motive and intent that would
make the irrelevance of motive claim descriptively true, as opposed to
true only by definition.”14 In other words, the maxim is either false or
vacuous. Professor Douglas Husak contends that “according to any
plausible conception” of what motive means, motive can be shown to
be relevant to criminal liability.15 Husak thus calls for an
abandonment of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim,16 which he claims
17
has had a “pernicious impact” on the law.
This Note accepts Professor Husak’s challenge. It defends the
truth of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim by applying a conception of
motive that is not only “plausible,” but that conforms to the historical
meaning of the term. Part I explains the conceptions of motive
espoused by two of the most influential commentators on the topic,
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen and Professor Jerome Hall, and defends
the success of their explanations in coherently distinguishing between
motives and intentions. Part II demonstrates the inadequacy of the
predominant view of motive, which defines motive as a species of
intention. Applying Hall’s conception of motive, Part III argues that
the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is alive and well. Motive is indeed
irrelevant to criminal liability, with one exception: certain bias crime
statutes do make motive relevant to criminal liability. In light of the
maxim’s continued validity, participants in the debate over bias

(“Courts can acquit defendants with whose motives they sympathise, by redescribing their
intentions in terms of their motives to make it appear that they did not act with the appropriate
criminal intention.”).
12. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 231 (“The jury, if the defendant’s good motive
comes to its attention, might exercise its uncontrolled discretion to acquit.” (footnote omitted)).
13. See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, 8 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 5
(1989) (“The most effective (but least satisfactory) means to guarantee the accuracy of [the
irrelevance-of-motive maxim] is to construe it as a necessary truth. . . . But [this] thesis is
substantive, and is trivialized when construed as a tautology.”).
14. Binder, supra note 3, at 45.
15. Husak, supra note 13, at 5.
16. HUSAK, supra note 1, at 148.
17. See id. (remarking, in reference to benevolent euthanasia cases in which the
defendant’s good motives were ignored, that “[i]t is monstrous that a defendant should be
convicted of the most serious offense known to the criminal law when he loving and regretfully
complies with a request to kill his suffering and incurable spouse”).
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crimes should recognize just how exceptional these new crimes are in
the criminal law.
I. MOTIVE AS WHOLLY DISTINCT FROM INTENTION
The distinction between intention and motive is far from settled.
“It might be thought that a clear distinction between intention and
motive can be drawn, given the radical difference in treatment that
follows from categorizing a mental state as one or the other. In fact,
however, the distinction has long bedeviled law students and criminal
theorists alike.”18 Nevertheless, despite such confusion, a clear
distinction between motive and intention does exist. The view of
motive defended here—that motive refers not to intended
consequences, but to the reason those consequences are desirable to
the actor—is best understood through the writings of two influential
proponents of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim: Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen and Professor Jerome Hall. Although the two theorists held
slightly different conceptions of motive, they both viewed motive as a
concept wholly distinct from intention—meaning that a motive could
never be an intention, or vice versa. This Part explains Stephen’s and
Hall’s distinctions between motive and intention, and then embraces
Hall’s distinction,19 defending its logical coherence.
A. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’s View
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen is regarded as one of the “most
influential exponents of the irrelevance of motive maxim.”20 Although
21
his explanation has been misread, Stephen was clear that intentions
are neither “synonymous with motives” nor a broader category that
includes motives and nonmotives.22

18. Id. at 144.
19. This Note specifically defends Hall’s view because it is both more sensible and better
explained than Stephen’s view and because the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is often viewed as
“Hall’s thesis.” See, e.g., Husak, supra note 13, at 4 (referring to the maxim as “Hall’s thesis”).
20. Binder, supra note 3, at 37 (referring to Victorian-era British judge and historian Sir
James Fitzjames Stephen and Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes as the two most
influential exponents of the maxim).
21. See infra notes 33–34 and accompanying text for an explanation of how Stephen’s
distinction between motive and intentions has been misread.
22. 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 110–12
(1883).
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1. The Two Fallacies of Which Stephen Warns. In his 1883 work
History of the Criminal Law of England, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen
warns “against two common fallacies, namely, the confusion between
motive and intention, and [second,] the tendency to deny an
immediate intention because of the existence, real or supposed, of
some ulterior intention.”23 Understanding what Stephen means by
these “fallacies” illustrates two fundamental principles about
intentions in the criminal law. The first principle is that motive is
irrelevant in the criminal law—the irrelevance-of-motive maxim. The
24
other principle asserts the irrelevance of a more “ulterior intention.”
According to this second principle, just as one’s most ultimate
intention is irrelevant to criminal liability, so too are any intentions
more ultimate than those included in a crime’s mens rea requirement.
That is, even if one’s most ultimate goal is to save the world, this does
not save one’s actions from criminality. The confusion surrounding
the irrelevance-of-motive maxim can ultimately be explained as
resulting from the conflation of these two distinct principles.25
Following a cursory discussion of the fallacies Stephen addresses, Part
I.A.2 elaborates on the distinction between the two.
The first fallacy Stephen warns of is the subject of this Note: the
confusion between motives and intentions. Stephen identifies an
actor’s motive as “the prevailing feeling in his mind at the time when
he acted rather than the desire to produce the particular result which
26
his conduct was intended to produce.” To explain this distinction,
Stephen presents the following illustration:
A puts a loaded pistol to B’s temple and shoots B through the head
deliberately, and knowing that the pistol is loaded and that the
wound must certainly be mortal. It is obvious that in every such case
the intention of A must be to kill B. On the other hand, the act in
itself throws no light whatever on A’s motives for killing B. . . . They
may have been mixed in all imaginable degrees. The motive may
have been a desire for revenge, or a desire for plunder, or a wish on
A’s part to defend himself against an attack by B, or a desire to kill
an enemy in battle, or to put a man already mortally wounded out of

23. Id. at 111.
24. This second principle is discussed further in Part I.A.2.
25. See infra Part I.A.2 for an explanation of how Stephen’s distinction between motive
and intention has been misread as a distinction between proximate and ultimate intentions.
26. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 110.
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his agony. In all these cases the intention is the same, but the
27
motives are different . . . .

It would be easy to interpret Stephen’s first fallacy as saying motive
means a more ulterior intention, and because more ulterior intentions
are irrelevant, motives are irrelevant. Under a correct reading of
Stephen, however, motive should be understood as distinct from
intentions altogether. To see this, consider the second fallacy Stephen
describes.
The second potential fallacy is that of excusing a prohibited
intention based on the existence of some ulterior intention. To
illustrate this point, Stephen discusses the case of Rex v. Woodburne
28
and Coke, an English case in which the defendants were charged
with wounding another “with intent to maim and disfigure.”29 One
defendant claimed to be innocent of this crime because he did not
30
intend to disfigure the victim, but rather to kill him. Stephen
explained, however, that the legal concept of “intention” does not
refer only to the most ultimate intended consequence of an action,
but to all consequences sought as a means to achieving the ultimate
end.31 Thus, Stephen asserted that the jury was properly instructed to
determine whether disfiguring the victim was a consequence that the
defendant had desired as a means of achieving his ultimate goal of
murder.32
2. Distinguishing between the Two
Fitzjames Stephen’s discussion of these
motive with intention and mistakenly
intentions are relevant—points to a

Fallacies.
Sir James
two fallacies—confusing
believing that ulterior
third potential pitfall:

27. Id. at 110–11.
28. THE TRIAL OF JOHN WOODBURNE AND ARUNDEL COKE, ESQ. AT SUFFOLK ASSIZES,
FOR FELONY, IN WILLFULLY SLITTING THE NOSE OF EDWARD CRISPE, GENT. (* 8 GEORGE I.
A.D. 1722), reprinted in 16 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS
FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM EARLIEST PERIOD TO
THE YEAR 1783 WITH NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS, at 53 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 2000)
(T.B. Howell comp., T.C. Hansard 1812).
29. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 112.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 110–11 (rejecting the view that only the ultimate intentions are relevant and
suggesting that one’s intentions can be inferred from the natural consequences of one’s actions).
32. Id. at 112 (instructing the jury to “consider whether the means made use of to effect
and accomplish that murder and the consequence of those means were not in the intention and
design of the party; whether every blow and cut and the consequences thereof were not
intended, as well as the end for which it is alleged the blows and cuts were given”).
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misconstruing the two fallacies as one and the same. The mistake
results from interpreting Stephen’s examples of motives—“a wish on
A’s part to defend himself against an attack by B, or a desire to kill an
enemy in battle,” and so forth—as examples of intended
33
consequences. Professor Guyora Binder falls prey to this pitfall,
claiming that Stephen views motives as “desired ends.”34 That this
interpretation is a misreading can best be illustrated through a
concrete example.
In a hypothetical based on the Woodburne case described in Part
35
I.A.1, Donny Defendant strikes Victor Victim seven times on his
face and head with a knife. Further, suppose that Donny’s intended
consequences for this action can be listed, in order from most
temporally proximate to temporally ultimate, as follows: (1) Victor’s
face and head suffer cuts and other injuries, (2) Victor is severely
injured, and (3) Victor dies.
Assuming that this is a complete list of the consequences Donny
intended, what was his motive for the assault? According to Stephen’s
view, the reader should have no idea. For Stephen, motive is not an
intended consequence of the action. Motive is “the prevailing feeling
in [the defendant’s] mind at the time when he acted rather than the
desire to produce the particular result which his conduct was intended
36
to produce.” Although the list of Donny’s intended consequences
37
rules out certain possible motives, many others remain. For example,
Donny may have attacked Victor out of bloodlust, a desire for
revenge, or to minimize Victor’s suffering.
These descriptions of potential motives form the potential source
of confusion. One might think that what Stephen calls “motives” can
be redescribed in terms of intended consequences—interpreting
“having a desire for revenge” as meaning “having the intended
33. Id. at 111.
34. Binder, supra note 3, at 38–40 (“For Stephen, intentions are compound mental states,
combining volitions and expectations. They are consequences not merely desired, but chosen or
accepted, as the likely consequences of acts that are chosen. Thus, there are intentions
(expected consequences of acts) that are not motives, because not desired. And there are
motives (desired ends) that are not intentions, because not acted upon.”).
35. In the Woodburne case, “Woodburne, at Coke’s instigation, struck Crispe about the
head and face with a billhook seven distinct blows.” STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 112 (discussing
THE TRIAL OF JOHN WOODBURNE AND ARUNDEL COKE, ESQ. AT SUFFOLK ASSIZES, FOR
FELONY, IN WILLFULLY SLITTING THE NOSE OF EDWARD CRISPE, GENT., supra note 28). The
defense of intending murder rather than disfigurement was offered by Coke. Id.
36. Id. at 110.
37. See infra Part III.A for a defense of this claim.
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consequence of achieving revenge.” In the Donny hypothetical,
however, achieving revenge is not a separate consequence following
from Victor’s death; it is simply a different characterization of the
38
same event. This is the distinction between motive and intention.
Intention refers to the events the defendant sought to bring about
whereas motive refers to a subjective reason the defendant desired to
bring about those events.
With this distinction in mind, notice that Stephen’s two fallacies
identify two distinct categories of irrelevant information. The first
fallacy points to the irrelevance of motive. As applied to the Donny
example, it is irrelevant whether Donny assaulted Victor out of
bloodlust or to minimize Victor’s suffering. As far as the criminal law
is concerned, Donny intended and attempted to kill a human being;
his motive for doing so is simply not relevant. The second fallacy
asserts the irrelevance of a more ulterior intention. Assuming Victor
survived the attack, it is irrelevant whether or not maiming him was
Donny’s ultimate goal. So long as Donny intended to maim Victor in
39
the process of seeking his ultimate goal, Donny “intended” to maim
him. Stephen’s two fallacies illustrate two separate principles of
criminal law.
3. Why Stephen Says Motive Should Be Irrelevant. Sir James
Fitzjames Stephen offers three “conclusive” reasons why motive
should not be relevant to criminal liability.40 First, defendants’
motives do not affect the harm that their actions have on society:41

38. This conclusion is consistent with Stephen’s discussion, STEPHEN, supra note 22, at
110–12, 119–21; however, the distinction between separate events and separate characterizations
of the same event was added to make sense of Stephen’s conclusion, and is further discussed
infra in Section I.C. Even with this addition, Stephen did not view motive as an ulterior
intention; otherwise, his two fallacies would be one and the same. See id. at 111 (labelling the
confusion between motive and intention a separate fallacy from the mistake of ignoring an
immediate intention because of the existence of a more ultimate one).
39. This determination would depend upon whether it qualifies as “maiming” to disfigure
someone for the short interval between an assault and death.
40. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 121.
41. Id. Contemporary commentators debate whether a motive of racial prejudice can
exacerbate the harm of a defendant’s crime. Compare Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488
(1993) (“[A]ccording to the State and its amici, bias-motivated crimes are more likely to
provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite
community unrest.”), and LAWRENCE, supra note 4, at 39–44 (arguing that bias crimes,
compared to their unbiased counterparts, are “far more likely to be violent,” cause greater
“psychophysiological symptoms,” ignite “inter-community tensions,” and cause stigmatization,
which brings about “humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred”), with Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S.
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[O]ne great object of criminal law is to prevent certain acts which
are injurious to society. But the mischief of an act depends upon the
intention, not upon the motives of the agent. If a man intentionally
burns down a house, or intentionally wounds the owner, the
injury . . . is equally great, whether the offender’s motive was or was
not one in which the public in general would be inclined to
42
sympathise.

Second, Stephen says “it is impossible to determine with any
approach to precision . . . a man’s motive for any given act. They are
43
always mixed, and they generally vary.” Third, Stephen claims that
because of the first two reasons, even if motive is made doctrinally
relevant, it will not become relevant in fact. He defends this
conclusion by reference to “malice.”
Although the word “malice” means “wickedness,” and therefore
does invoke the concept of motive, “the word seldom if ever bears its
44
natural sense.” Stephen explains how, to avoid the problems of
punishing motives, the term “malice” is defined through legal fictions
that avoid reference to motives.
Malice is divided into ‘express’ malice and ‘constructive’ or ‘implied’
malice, or, as it is sometimes called, ‘malice in law’ and ‘malice in
fact.’ The effect of this fiction is that bad motives are by a rule of law
imputed where intentional misconduct not prompted by bad motives
45
is proved.

In other words, although the term “malice” invokes a defendant’s
motives, the criminal law operationally defines “malice” through
46
other legal constructs that do not involve motive. The word malice

Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1085–93 (2004) (“It is not
hatred and bias, as such, that hurt; rather it is the perception of hatred and bias that hurts. . . . So
if the psychic trauma to victims of hate/bias crimes is thought to be the gravaman [sic]of the
offense, then the law should not be concerned with the motive of the offender, but rather, with
the perception of the defendant’s motive by the victim.”).
42. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 121. The reasons for punishing intentional harms differently
from harms produced accidentally fall outside the scope of this note.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 119–20 (explaining that the reason “malice” is never applied in accord with its
natural meaning is because the term invokes the concept of motive).
45. Id. at 121.
46. This pattern has been repeated with regard to bias crimes statutes. See infra notes 173–
76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the way statutory bias crime language that
references a defendant’s motives can be operationally defined through legal concepts that
inquire only into a defendant’s intentions.
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therefore fails to retain its natural meaning in the law, and Stephen
suggests that “if the law were codified it might with great advantage
47
be altogether omitted from the criminal law.”
To Stephen, motive should thus be irrelevant because: (1) it is
unrelated to the degree an actor has harmed society; (2) it is almost
impossible to determine; and (3) even if a legal concept were to
invoke a defendant’s motives, such as the concept of malice, the first
two considerations would persuade judges to adopt a motive-free
interpretation of that concept.
B. Professor Jerome Hall’s View
In 1947, Professor Jerome Hall reiterated the validity of the
irrelevance-of-motive maxim.48 Although the maxim’s truth had been
challenged by that time, Hall explained that this critique resulted
49
from an unfortunate conflation of motive and intention. Hall blamed
Sir John William Salmond for the mistaken view that motive is a
50
species of intention. Without explanation or citation, Salmond had
defined “motive” as an “ulterior intent,” and thus had concluded that
there are many exceptions to the general principle that motive is
irrelevant.51 Take the example of burglary, which Salmond defined as
“breaking and entering a dwelling-house by night with intent to
commit a felony therein.”52 Under Salmond’s view, a motive is any
ulterior intention, and thus an intent to commit a felony once inside
53
the dwelling constitutes a “motive” for breaking and entering.
Salmond concluded that motive is indeed relevant for burglary, as
well as for criminal attempts, forgery, defamation, malicious
prosecution, and the defense of necessity.54
Hall explains that these categories would never have been
construed as exceptions to the irrelevance-of-motive maxim had
Salmond applied the “usual distinction between intention and
55
motive.” In reference to the burglary example:

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 120.
HALL, supra note 2, at 83–93 (arguing that motive is irrelevant to criminal liability).
Id. at 85.
Id. at 85–87 (“Salmond’s views have had considerable influence in this country . . . .”).
JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 343–48 (4th ed. 1913).
Id. at 346.
Id.
Id. at 343–48.
HALL, supra note 2, at 86.
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The breaking may have been in order to enter, the entry in order to
steal, the stealing in order to get money to buy things, the buying of
things to effect other objectives. But it does not aid analysis to
designate the various subsequent intentions or the final “ulterior”
one a “motive.”
That an intention is beyond or “ulterior” to the scope of legal
relevance does not transform it into a motive in the generally
56
accepted legal sense of the term.

For Hall, in contrast, “intention . . . refers to the objective effect
which the law-breaker contrives to produce on others by his act or
omission, and . . . motive refers to the subjective effect and its
57
accompanying emotion which he desires to produce on himself.”
58
Motive is “a ground or reason for action.” Hall’s use of the word
“reason” is instructive. A “motive” is not a driving force that compels
59
a person’s actions. Hall says “[i]t is doubtful whether one is
responsible for his motives; but the crucial point for legal purposes is
that action involves a choice.”60 Thus, Hall distinguishes the legal use
of “motive” from psychiatrists’ understanding of “motive” as a
61
scientific cause.
Hall insightfully explains the source of Salmond’s confusion.
Although Salmond and his followers were right to identify “motive”
with the question of why a person acted as he or she did, they
confused different types of answers to “why” questions because of the
62
ambiguity of the word. For Hall, “motive answers the question why,
neither in terms of causation nor in those of a further ulterior

56. Id. at 87.
57. Id. at 90 n.79 (quoting W. Norwood East, Murder, from the Point of View of the
Psychiatrist, 3 MED.-LEGAL & CRIM. REV. 69–70 (1935)) (internal quotations omitted).
58. Id. at 92.
59. See id. at 89 n.77 (“In the legal view, there is no compulsion or necessity in the action of
normal persons.”).
60. Id. at 90.
61. Id. at 89.
62. See id. (“In a formal way [Salmond and his followers] recognized the difference
between asking what a person did, i.e. to ascertain whether he acted, and why he acted that way.
But they did not adhere to the ordinary and legal difference between these ideas. For when they
asked ‘why did a person do a particular act’? they proceeded to answer it in terms of an
objective which he sought, an intention oriented towards the future, a purpose, which they
called ‘motive.’ The ambiguity of ‘why’ implemented their predilection.”). These different types
of “why” are discussed infra in Part I.C.
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objective, but in terms that give a reason which is the subject of an
63
ethical appraisal.”
As discussed in Part III, the choice between Salmond’s and
Hall’s definitions is crucial to whether the irrelevance-of-motive
maxim is rendered descriptively true or false. If the “motive” for an
action is any ulterior intention of that act, then burglary indeed makes
use of “motive.” If Hall’s and Stephen’s conceptions are correct,
however, the offense of burglary does not implicate motive, given that
a burglar burglarizes whether driven by hunger or a thirst for
adventure.
In addition to defending motive’s empirical irrelevance to
criminal law, Hall defends the view that motive should be irrelevant
to criminal liability. Hall does not defend this view by claiming that
64
motive is irrelevant to moral culpability. On the contrary, he says
moral culpability cannot be determined unless both intention and
motive are considered:
For example, D kills T; all agree that what he did is morally wrong.
But the appraisal of D’s moral culpability must also take account of
his motive: was D acting from cupidity, knowing he was named the
chief beneficiary of T’s will? Or was the motive his love for his sick
wife who needed an operation? . . . [W]e cannot pass an adequate
moral judgment if we know only what harm has been committed but
65
not the motive for committing it . . . .

Hall recognizes that excluding motives when determining
criminal liability sometimes results in outcomes that are out of
66
balance with morality. But he says these outcomes must be tolerated
because the alternative would be to make the substantive rules
67
vague. “[T]he preservation of the objective meaning of . . . mens rea
as well as of the attendant principle of legality has its price. For it is
impossible to forbid any class of harms without including rare
marginal instances where . . . the value protected by the rule was not
impaired in that instance.”68 Hall insists that the moral judgment
imposed by the penal law must be absolute, so as to encourage
63. HALL, supra note 2, at 93.
64. Id. at 93–94.
65. Id. at 93.
66. See id. at 95–96 (recognizing the problems that arise in “marginal cases” and suggesting
that these inequitable outcomes be mitigated).
67. Id. at 95.
68. Id. at 94.
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69
conformity to the law. If a particular outcome seems inequitable,
Hall says lawmakers can redefine criminal laws to account for this
exceptional situation without making reference to motive.70
Hall also stresses that making motive relevant to criminal
liability would require the finder of fact to make difficult
determinations about a defendant’s motive.71 Even when not
impossible, the task of determining a person’s motive can be arduous,
sometimes requiring a “detailed case-history of the defendant’s past
72
life.” Even if one’s motive could be established, judges and juries
would then have to pass judgment on whether the motive was good or
bad,73 thus stripping objectivity from the principle of mens rea.74
Despite this firm stance on motive’s irrelevance to criminal
liability, Hall lets motive in the back door. When confronted with a
Jean Valjean,75 Hall recommends the use of official discretion, such as
foregoing prosecution or suspending a sentence, to provide a “safety
valve” to rectify the injustice created by unsympathetic substantive
rules.76 Achieving this result informally “preserves the principles of
mens rea and legality in the vast majority of cases.”77 To Hall,
allocating questions of motive to the administration of justice is
greatly preferable to making motive doctrinally relevant, which would
depreciate “both penal law and its ethical significance by making the
relevant rules vague.”78

69. Id. at 94–95.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 99.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 104.
75. Jean Valjean is a character in Les Misérables who went to prison for breaking a window
pane and stealing a loaf of bread to feed his family. VICTOR HUGO, LES MISÉRABLES 95
(Norman Denny trans., Penguin Books 1982) (1862).
76. HALL, supra note 2, at 104; accord Hessick, supra note 6, at 92 & nn.6–10 (discussing
the famous case of Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, R v. Dudley & Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D.
273, in which the defendant sailors, having cannibalized one of their own to survive at sea, only
served six months in prison despite receiving death sentences, id.).
77. HALL, supra note 2, at 95. On the relevance of motive, it appears that “[t]he Law In
Action is as malleable as The Law On The Books is uncompromising.” HUSAK, supra note 1, at
148 (quoting Yale Kamisar, Some Nonreligious Views Against Proposed “Mercy Killing”
Legislation: A Rejoinder, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 971 (1958)).
78. Id.
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C. Motive and Intention Are Conceptually Distinct under This View
Both Sir James Fitzjames Stephen and Professor Jerome Hall
79
agree that motive is an entirely distinct concept from intention.
Although their views are similar, they are not identical. Stephen
identifies motive as the prevailing feeling in the actor’s mind,80
whereas Hall identifies it as the subjective effect that actor seeks to
81
produce upon himself by acting. This Note specifically defends
Hall’s view because it is both more sensible and better explained, and
because the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is often viewed as “Hall’s
thesis.”82
According to Professor Douglas Husak, “the claim that
intentions describe while motives explain cannot be assessed without
sophisticated theories of descriptions and explanations, and no
83
criminal theorist has yet produced them.” Although this Note does
not connect the distinction between motive and intentions to a grand
epistemological scheme, this Section explains and defends Hall’s
distinction as logically coherent by expounding on the difference
between the two concepts. The further question of whether this
definition saves the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is discussed in Part
III.
As Hall indicates, questions asking “why” something happened
84
the way it did are susceptible to several types of answers. One type
of explanation would be a scientific one. To explain why a billiard ball
fell into the corner pocket, one could combine information about
natural laws with information about the states (masses, velocities,
locations, etc.) of the balls at a given time to explain why the ball
acted the way it did. Regardless of whether human behaviors are
theoretically susceptible to this type of deterministic explanation, the
criminal law presumes otherwise—assuming that every lawbreaker
possessed the power to choose to obey the law.85

79. See supra Part I.A–B.
80. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Husak, supra note 13, at 4–6 (labeling the assertion that motive is irrelevant in
the criminal law “Hall’s thesis”).
83. Id. at 7.
84. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hall’s view on the
ambiguity of “why.”
85. HALL, supra note 2, at 89 n.77 (“In the legal view, there is no compulsion or necessity
in the action of normal persons.”).
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A different sort of explanation is required whenever examining
“why” a defendant took a particular course of action in the context of
the criminal law. To understand why a defendant took the action he
did, the explanation proceeds in terms of intended consequences,
with each intention explaining the preceding intention. Donny’s act of
striking Victor’s face is explained by the fact that Donny intended to
seriously injure his victim. His intention to seriously injure Victor is
explained by his further intention to kill Victor. But what explains
that intention? Given that, based on the facts of the hypothetical,
86
Donny intends no consequences beyond Victor’s death, this
intended consequence cannot be explained by reference to a more
ultimate one. Each step in this explanation merely pushes the
question back a level.
The ultimate intended consequence can only be explained by
reference to the actor’s motive—for example, a desire for revenge.
This last piece of information does not resolve every possible
question about Donny’s actions. One could still wonder why Donny
believed cuts to the face would be deadly or why Donny thought
revenge could be achieved through Victor’s death. Nevertheless, as
Hall stresses, the motive helps explain the “reason” for Donny’s
87
actions.
One possible objection to this distinction between motives and
intentions is that “achieving revenge” is not conceptually different
from “severely injuring Victor” or any of Donny’s other intended
consequences. According to this argument, the Donny/Victor
hypothetical begs the question because it defines Donny’s motive of
“achieving revenge” as something other than an intention by
excluding it from the so-called complete list of intended
consequences. The question raised by this criticism is whether
“achieving revenge” is indeed a different sort of thing from Donny’s
intended consequences. It is. Notice that each of the intended
consequences, or “intentions,” is an event. Each one temporally
88
follows the preceding one. As such, the method of explaining one

86. See supra Part I.A.2 for a complete list of intended consequences and a description of
Victor’s death as the most ulterior intention.
87. See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
88. It is not true that all intended consequences must occur at different times. With a more
complicated (and thus more realistic) example, the set of intended consequences would not
proceed as a single chain of events, each having but one effect. Rather, any ordinary action
would have many effects, and each of these effects would have many consequences of its own. It
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intention by reference to another is to explain how Donny expected
the earlier event to bring about the later event. This pattern would be
broken if “achieving revenge” were added to the chain of intended
consequences. “Achieving revenge” was not an event Donny
expected to follow Victor’s death, but rather a characterization of
Victor’s death that had special meaning to Donny. As Hall says,
“[t]he reference of ‘motive’ . . . is to the actor, whereas intention is
directed outside him.”89 The concepts of motive and intention are thus
conceptually distinct. The word “intention . . . refers to the objective
effect which the law-breaker contrives to produce on others by his act
or omission, and . . . motive refers to the subjective effect and its
accompanying emotion which he desires to produce on himself.”90
The view of motive discussed in this Part is not only historically
supported by Stephen’s and Hall’s discussions, but also creates a
conceptually coherent distinction between motive and intent. Before
examining the truth of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim in light of
this distinction,91 Part II shows that other proposed definitions of
motive either fail to identify a conceptually distinct concept, or bear
little relation to the original legal term.
II. THE INADEQUACY OF OTHER DEFINITIONS OF MOTIVE
In contrast to the view presented in Part I, which defines motive
92
as a conceptually distinct category from intention, other views define
motives and intentions in such a way that the categories overlap.93
is certainly possible for two such consequences to occur at the same time. The important point is
that they would be separate events, not differing characterizations of the same event.
89. HALL, supra note 2, at 90 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 90 n.79 (quoting W. Norwood East, Murder, from the Point of View of the
Psychiatrist, 3 MED.-LEGAL & CRIM. REV. 69–70 (1935)).
91. See infra Part III.
92. Hyman Gross’s definition of motive appears to also fall into the category of those that
classify motives as conceptually distinct from intentions. See HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 111 (1979) (distinguishing motives from intentions in that motives do not
have a beginning and an end and that motive is an explanation of an action, not a description of
it). Gross uses this illustration: “If a rich man has an ugly daughter, he is concerned about her
suitor’s motives. But a poor man with a beautiful daughter is concerned about her suitor’s
intentions.” Id. However, the specifics of Gross’s conception of motive are not clear from this
illustration or from his description of motive. See HUSAK, supra note 1, at 145–46 (“[T]his
account . . . does not make sense of Gross’s own example.”); Whitley R. P. Kaufman, Motive,
Intention, and Morality in the Criminal Law, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 317, 322 (2003) (claiming
Gross’s illustration “haunts” the discussion of motive).
93. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 92, at 322–23 (describing the approach of defining
motive as an ulterior intention).
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These definitions trivialize the irrelevance-of-motive maxim.
Although a successful distinction between motive and intention need
not render the maxim true, it should at least make sense of why the
94
maxim has been so adamantly defended. These definitions, by
overlapping the concepts of motives and intentions, render the
irrelevance-of-motive maxim either (1) incoherent, (2) so trivially
false that it never should have been uttered, or (3) a mere renaming
of some different principle of law altogether.
A. The Problems with Conflating Motive and Intention
Contemporary views that conflate motive with intention fall into
95
two categories. Under the first approach, motive is defined as a
special type of intention. “The most common way of distinguishing
[motive from intention] is to hold that a motive, even if it is a sort of
intention, is distinguished from other intentions in that it is ‘ulterior’
or ‘ultimate[]’ . . . .”96 Under this view, motive is the “the intention
with which an intentional act is done. Intention, when distinguished
97
from motive, relates to the means, motive to the end.” Under the
second approach, motive is identified as a broader category that
includes some intentions, but that also includes elements other than
intentions—anything that can provide a reason for the defendant’s
actions.98 Professor Douglas Husak, for example, describes motive as
a “polymorphous collection of action initiators,” which includes both
99
intentions and non-intentions. Under either of these approaches, the
concepts of motive and intention overlap such that at least some
94. Recall Hall’s claim that “hardly any part of penal law is more definitely settled than
that motive is irrelevant.” HALL, supra note 2, at 88 (citing State v. Logan, 126 S.W.2d 256 (Mo.
1939) (per curiam)). In light of the treatment of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim as having
content—demonstrated by the many decisions which claim to rest on this principle—defining
motive so as to trivialize the maxim is an unacceptable outcome, unless there is no other choice.
See, e.g., United States v. Harmon, 45 F. 414, 419–24 (D. Kan. 1891) (rejecting the defendant’s
argument that committing a prohibited act is lawful if done with a beneficent purpose).
95. This categorization is consistent with that of Elaine Chiu. See Elaine M. Chiu, The
Challenge of Motive in the Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 653, 664–66 (categorizing views
of motive as (1) completely different from intent; (2) a sub-category of intent; or (3) a functional
polymorphous category of action initiators, including both intentions and non-intentions).
96. Kaufman, supra note 92, at 322–23; see LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 227
(describing this view).
97. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 48 (1961).
98. See Hessick, supra note 6, at 94–95 (defining motives as a defendant’s “reasons for
acting,” and explaining that intentions can also be motives).
99. Husak, supra note 13, at 7–8 (quoting Christine Sistare, Agent Motives and the Criminal
Law, 13 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 303, 306 (1987)).
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motives are also ulterior intended consequences. This shared
characteristic ultimately requires the rejection of both types of
definitions.
1. These Definitions Render the Maxim Incoherent. The maxim
is incoherent under definitions that conflate motive and intention
because they create a relative conception of motive such that motives
and intentions do not differ in any context-independent way;100 one
cannot identify any particular motive without specifying what
101
behavior it is a motive for. The distinction between motive and
intent is thus a relative one under this conception, a characterization
Professor Glanville Williams accepts and defends:
Much of what men do involves a chain of intention (D pulls the
trigger of his revolver in order to make the bullet enter P’s body in
order to kill P in order to get him out of the way etc.), and each
102
intention is a motive for that preceding it.

Given that every intention is a motive for something else, Professor
Husak concludes that the only intention that is not also a motive is
103
the one “currently entertained by the defendant.” Husak criticizes
this definition because the identity of something as a “motive”
104
changes with time.
Husak’s argument can be taken even further to show that a
relative conception of motive renders the irrelevance-of-motive
maxim incoherent. Consider a statute that defines murder as
105
purposely causing the death of another human being. Unlike the
burglary example, which inquires into the ulterior purpose for which

100. See HUSAK, supra note 1, at 144–45 (criticizing the relative nature of the
motive/intention distinction).
101. Contrast this with the absolute conception of motive presented in Part I. If “stealing
diamonds” is the intention with which a thief reached into the jewelry case, it does not
transform into a motive when one seeks to explain why the thief broke into the house. Because
motives and intentions are different sorts of things, the question of whether something is a
motive or an intention has a single answer that does not vary with context.
102. See WILLIAMS, supra note 97, at 48 & n.2 and accompanying text (explaining that
intention relates to the means of an action, whereas motive relates to the ends).
103. HUSAK, supra note 1, at 145.
104. Id.
105. The Model Penal Code suggests this approach. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1(1),
210.2(1) (1962).
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106
an action was done, this definition of murder inquires into whether
the prohibited act—causing a person’s death—was purposeful. Thus,
under the conception of motive as a more ulterior intention, motive is
107
not relevant with regard to this statute. Now consider another
hypothetical statute that defines murder as “performing any bodily
act with the intention of causing the death of another human being,
where the bodily act causes the death of that other human being.”
This statute is functionally identical to the first murder statute, yet the
second version references an ulterior intention in the same way a
burglary statute does. Like burglary, the second statute inquires into
the defendant’s ulterior intention for committing the prohibited act.
Under this type of definition—that defines motive as a type of more
ultimate intention—the question of whether motive is relevant to the
offense of murder yields different answers depending on functionally
irrelevant changes to a statute’s wording.
Due to the relative nature of this view of motive as an ulterior
intention, whether or not a statute involves motive becomes purely
semantic. This renders the irrelevance-of-motive maxim incoherent.108
Because there can be no answer to the question of whether crimes,
such as murder, relate to motive, the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is
neither true nor false. Its assertion simply does not make sense. In
light of the longstanding history of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim,
any definition that renders the maxim incoherent should be rejected if
an alternate view that does not trivialize the maxim exists.

2. These Definitions Render the Maxim Trivially False. Even if
the incoherency problem could somehow be solved, thus allowing the
106. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 228 (describing the view that crimes such as
burglary—which require a mental state “beyond the defendant’s intent to do those acts or cause
those consequences” defined in the statute—make relevant the defendant’s motive for doing
those acts).
107. Some have claimed, however, that all specific intent crimes involve motives. See infra
note 140.
108. Professor Frederick Lawrence makes a similar argument, stating two functionally
identical descriptions of a bias crime, one that inquires beyond the defendant’s intention, and
one that does not. LAWRENCE, supra note 4, at 108–09. The analogous argument, however,
leads Lawrence to the opposite conclusion from the one defended in this Note. Because
Lawrence considers only a single definition of motive—“the cause that drives the actor to
commit the offense”—he concludes that the “distinction between intent and motive does not
hold the weight that the Mitchell and Wyant state courts placed upon it . . . .” Id. at 108. When
Hall’s definition is added to the list, however, Lawrence’s argument merely adds a reason to
reject the nonsensical definition in favor of Hall’s. For a discussion of Mitchell and Wyant, see
supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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maxim to at least make an empirical assertion, that assertion would
be trivially false under these definitions of motive. The scheme of
defining motive as a concept that overlaps that of intention must be
rejected because it trivializes the irrelevance-of-motive maxim as
incoherent or—if this incoherency problem could somehow be
overcome—patently false, thus failing to make sense of the maxim’s
109
long history of endorsement.
The view that motive is a type of ulterior intention renders the
110
maxim false, as the maxim’s critics have proclaimed. If motive is a
type of ulterior intention, then burglary statutes, as well as many
other categories of crimes,111 demonstrate that motive is indeed
112
relevant to criminal liability, in contravention to the maxim. Had
the definition of motive been well settled, the fact that this type of
definition renders the irrelevance-of-motive maxim false would be the
end of the issue; critics of the maxim could simply express
bewilderment as to why smart people reach such obviously wrong
conclusions,113 and move on. When confronted with an alternative
conception of motive that does not trivialize longstanding principles,
however, the bewildering definition should be rejected.
B. Embracing the Definitional Truth: Duff’s View
Although Professor Antony Duff also defines motive as a
concept that overlaps with intention, his novel defense of this type of
definition deserves separate consideration. Although Duff is
successful in defending the maxim’s truth, he does so only by so
altering the maxim’s meaning that it refers to a separate principle

109. A successful distinction between motive and intention should at least make sense of
why the maxim was so adamantly defended by criminal law theorists such as Professor Hall. See
supra Part I.B.
110. See SALMOND, supra note 51, at 341–46 (writing in 1913 and identifying the simple
truth that ulterior intentions are relevant to criminal liability).
111. See infra Part III.B.1–2 for an explanation of how inchoate crimes, and perhaps specific
intent crimes, make reference to one’s ulterior intentions.
112. See SALMOND, supra note 51, at 346 (asserting that in crimes like burglary and forgery,
“the ulterior intent is the source, in whole or in part, of the mischevious tendency of the act, and
is therefore material in law”).
113. See HUSAK, supra note 1, at 147–48 (citing the lack of “outcry” from orthodox theorists
in response to the inclusion of offenses such as burglary and kidnapping, and defenses such as
duress and necessity, to conclude that the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is not persuasive to
orthodox theorists); Husak, supra note 13, at 13 n.1 (appending his citation to Hall’s book by
saying, “I offer no hypothesis about why Hall’s thesis is so widely accepted among criminal
theorists”).
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altogether. Unlike the typical definitions of motive that conflate
motive and intention, Duff defends a definition that renders the
114
maxim true by definition. As many commentators have pointed out,
one way to make the irrelevance-of-motive maxim true is by making
it a definitional truth—defining “motive” as the subset of intentions
that are irrelevant to criminal liability.115 For most theorists, this
116
option does not represent a legitimate possibility. Duff, however,
has attempted to defend the maxim along these lines.
Of course, Duff has not found a way around the hard fact that a
tautology has no empirical content. Rather, he construes the
irrelevance-of-motive maxim as having multiple dimensions of
content, such that it can make a substantive claim about one issue
117
while being true by definition along another dimension. Duff begins
by defining motive in such a way as to make it “a definitional truth
that anything which counts as a ‘motive’ is irrelevant to criminal
liability, thus making the orthodox doctrine true by definition.”118
Duff says it would be too hasty to dismiss this move as merely
119
trivializing a substantive claim by rendering it true by definition.
Rather, “by portraying the orthodox doctrine as a definitional truth
about the task of adjudication, we can see it as embodying a
substantive doctrine about ‘the rule of law’, and the distinction
between the tasks of legislation and of adjudication.”120
To protect the maxim from tautological status, Duff restates the
irrelevance-of-motive maxim as holding “not that ‘motive’ is
irrelevant to criminal liability, but that ‘further motive’ is irrelevant to
121
liability.” He also clarifies that the maxim applies only to courts,
and not to legislatures.122 Combining these steps, the statement
“motive is irrelevant to criminal liability” is transformed into the
114. See Duff, supra note 11, at 174 (“[B]y portraying the orthodox doctrine as a definitional
truth about the task of adjudication, we can see it as embodying a substantive doctrine about ‘the
rule of law’, and the distinction between the tasks of legislation and of adjudication.”).
115. HUSAK, supra note 1, at 146–47; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 229; Binder, supra
note 3, at 45.
116. See, e.g, HUSAK, supra note 1, at 146–47 (describing such characterizations as
“question-begging and unhelpful”); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 229 (calling this
reasoning circular).
117. Duff, supra note 11, at 174.
118. Id. at 173.
119. Id. at 174.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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statement that motive [beyond those motives made relevant to
criminal liability by the legislature] is irrelevant to criminal liability
[in a judicial context].
From this foundation, Duff describes the content that the maxim
retains, even though motive is defined by reference to criminal
liability:
The legislature defines crimes, by defining kinds of action that must
count as criminal. Those definitions might include motivational
factors . . . . [I]n deciding how particular crimes should be defined,
legislatures will be asking what kinds of motive should make what
kind of difference to criminal liability.
Once the legislature has defined crimes, it is for the courts to apply
those definitions to determine defendants’ criminal liability; and in
doing so, they should attend only to the issue of whether the
123
defendant’s actions matched the law’s definition of a crime.

Under Duff’s interpretation, the claim of the irrelevance-of-motive
maxim is not about the types of mental states that are relevant for
criminal liability. That claim is rendered true by definition. Rather,
the maxim is about the rule of law and the distribution of power
between legislatures and the courts.
Although Duff’s conception of motive appeals to common sense
and does not render the irrelevance-of-motive maxim false, it changes
the meaning of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim in such a
fundamental way that it refers to a separate principle of law
altogether. In the abstract, there is nothing wrong with defining
“motive” by reference to criminally irrelevant intentions, but doing so
entails discussing a different concept than the one at issue in the
debate over the irrelevance-of-motive maxim.124 One simply cannot
resolve a debate by drastically redefining all the terms to remove the
controversy.
The relevant question in evaluating Duff’s view is whether his
interpretations of “motive” and the irrelevance-of-motive maxim are
consistent with the way these concepts have historically been
discussed. If not, then Duff’s point about the respective roles of

123.
124.
Hall.

Id.
See supra Part I.A–B for an explanation of the meaning of the maxim to Stephen and
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125
courts and legislatures should be understood as an interesting
proposition, though an entirely distinct one from the irrelevance-ofmotive maxim. In defending his novel interpretation of the maxim,
Duff does not seek historical support for it; rather, he offers a
“justificatory” account for why the proposition is and should be
true.126 Even if Duff succeeds in showing that he has translated a
criticized maxim of orthodox criminal law into a descriptively true
and normatively defensible principle, he has so altered the original
maxim that he is discussing a new principle altogether.127 Despite
Duff’s creative approach, in the end his view so alters the meaning of
the irrelevance-of-motive maxim as to make it something entirely
different.
In light of the inadequacy of these alternative definitions of
motive, the term should properly be understood through Hall’s
conception of motive as the reason one’s intended consequences are
desirable. With this definition in mind, the truth of the maxim can be
evaluated.

III. THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF THE IRRELEVANCE-OFMOTIVE MAXIM
Evaluating the irrelevance-of-motive maxim’s truth requires first
pinning down its assertion. Thus clarified, the maxim’s narrow
claim—that motive is never directly doctrinally relevant to criminal
liability—is still valid.
A. Clarifying the Maxim’s Claim
Following Professor Jerome Hall’s explanation, the statement
that motive is irrelevant to criminal liability has a limited scope. Hall’s
maxim does not claim motive is irrelevant to moral culpability; just

125. See supra notes 118–23 and accompanying text for an explanation of Duff’s
interpretation of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim as a statement about the proper roles of
judges and legislators.
126. Duff, supra note 11, at 175–89 (emphasis removed).
127. Professor Binder reaches a similar conclusion: “Duff has replaced the maxim that
motive is irrelevant to liability with the quite different maxim that legislatures alone should
define offense elements and defenses. Having accepted the descriptive, logical, and normative
objections to the irrelevance of motive maxim, he has essentially abandoned it.” Binder, supra
note 3, at 94.
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128
the opposite is true. Furthermore, the maxim does not claim motive
is irrelevant in the entire justice system; in fact, Hall recommends
administrative consideration of motive.129 Lastly, the maxim does not
claim that evidence of motive is never relevant to determining
criminal liability, just that it is never directly relevant. This last claim
is essential for a defense of the maxim, and can be demonstrated by
the following observations about the information conveyed by
evidence of a defendant’s motives and by evidence of a defendant’s
intentions.
First, though a complete list of one’s intentions can rule out
certain possible motives, many possibilities remain. For example, it is
clear that Donny Defendant did not attempt to kill Victor Victim out
of lust.130 Although it is possible to attempt a murder out of lust—such
as when one believes a murder will impress a potential romantic
interest—in such cases, one of the perpetrator’s intended
consequences will relate to the motive of lust. According to the
postulated facts of the Donny/Victor hypothetical, Donny’s only
intended consequences were Victor’s injury and eventual death. His
crime thus cannot possibly have satisfied a drive for lust. Donny’s
motive for the attempted murder must have been one that could be
satiated by the death of another, without reference to any further
consequences. As explained in Part I.A.2, several possible motives fit
this description. Thus, evidence demonstrating a defendant’s
intentions can rule out some possible motives, but can leave many
remaining options. This observation demonstrates the broader
conclusion that information about one’s intentions can convey
information about one’s motives.131
Second, the converse is also true. Information about one’s
motives conveys information about one’s intentions. If A kills B for
the motive of “lust” one can infer that B’s death was not A’s ultimate

128. Hall argues that motive should be irrelevant to criminal liability even though he
stresses that an evaluation of motive is essential to judgments of moral culpability. See supra
notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (explaining that Hall prefers questions of
motive to be examined on an administrative—not a doctrinal—level).
130. The Donny/Victor hypothetical is introduced in Part I.A.2.
131. This conclusion is implied by Gross’s point that the legislature can use intentions as a
proxy for distinguishing between acts done from a particular motive. GROSS, supra note 92, at
112 (“If murder for money or for vengeance is to be singled out, the proscribed act may be
‘causing death of a person with intent to profit financially thereby’ or ‘with intent to avenge the
death of another.’”).
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intended consequence. Similarly, if a person commits a mugging with
the motive of “greed,” it would be reasonable to infer that the
mugger did not intend to choose a penniless victim.
Third, because information about motive can convey information
about intentions and vice versa, in certain circumstances, relevant
legal questions can be answered by reference to either motive or to
intent. Take the example of Paul, a police officer who lectures
students on gun safety in his spare time. While demonstrating the use
of a safety catch in a school auditorium, Paul pulls the trigger of his
gun, shooting and killing a teacher whom he knew personally. Did
Paul intend to kill the teacher? This question could be resolved by
proof (assuming such proof is possible) that Paul’s only intentions in
pulling the trigger were to depress the trigger, convey knowledge that
a safety catch prevents a gun from firing, and decrease the rate of
accidental firearm deaths in the community. If these were Paul’s only
intended consequences, the shooting could not have been intentional.
The same conclusion could also be reached, however, if it were
proven that Paul’s motive in pulling the trigger was to “be a role
model.” If, however, evidence showed that Paul did have a substantial
motive to kill the teacher, if he stood to profit from her death or if she
had broken his heart, it would add to the investigation and lend
credibility to the argument that Paul intended to kill her while
creating the appearance of an accident. Both information about
Paul’s motives and information about Paul’s intentions could be
sufficient to demonstrate that Paul did not intend to kill the teacher.
Fourth, the fact that evidence of motive can provide information
relevant to determining criminal liability does not make motive
directly relevant to criminal liability.132 In the Paul hypothetical,
notice that Paul’s motive is only indirectly relevant to liability. The
reason Paul’s motive could be relevant in his murder trial is because
his motive can shed light on his intentions. In this hypothetical,
motive is thus relevant in the same unofficial way as it is in many

132. Cf. State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90, 104 (Conn. 1993) (“Words can be used to prove an
intention to violate virtually any penal statute, however, and their use as evidence of crime does
not transform a statute criminalizing conduct into a statute implicating protected
communication. As the supreme court of Oregon pointed out in the context of that state’s ‘hate
crimes’ statute, there is a distinction between ‘making speech the crime itself, or an element of
the crime, and using speech to prove the crime.’” (quoting State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or.
1992))).
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133
criminal trials. If a defense attorney stresses to the jury that the
prosecution has no evidence of motive, it is not because motive is an
element of the crime, but to imply that the defendant had no reason
to commit the crime, and therefore never did. This argument would
fail in a case in which the prosecution presented indisputable
evidence that the defendant committed the crime, even if the
defendant’s reasons for doing so remained a mystery.134 In other
words, evidence of motive might help the jury to speculate as to
whether the defendant did the act, but motive is not directly
135
relevant. The same is true in the example about Paul’s motive in
pulling the trigger.
Observations three and four are vital to the question of whether
the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is true. Though motives can be
indirectly relevant to certain issues in criminal trials, the question
posed by the irrelevance-of-motive maxim is whether motive qua
136
motive is ever relevant to criminal liability. Stated more precisely,
can different motives affect criminal liability when coupled with
137
identical intentions?

133. Hessick, supra note 6, at 89–90 (“Everyone who watches Law & Order knows (or
thinks they know) that motive is very important in criminal justice. . . . Unlike in the television
show, which places great emphasis on a defendant’s reasons for committing a crime, in the
perceived real world of criminal liability, motive is just a bit player . . . . Evidence of a
defendant’s motive may be introduced at trial to convince a jury that she is guilty, but motive is
not perceived as a legal component of guilt.”).
134. See People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 452 (Cal. 1991) (“Motive here is, indeed, elusive.
This was apparently a random killing for a reason known only to defendant . . . [but we] have
never required the prosecution to prove a specific motive . . . . A senseless, random, but
premeditated, killing supports a verdict of first degree murder.”).
135. See GROSS, supra note 92, at 103 (discussing the way that motives are presented as part
of the prosecutor’s case even though motive is hardly ever a requirement for criminal liability).
136. See Husak, supra note 13, at 6 (“I am puzzled to understand what could be meant by
claiming that, although the criminal law is concerned with motives, it is not concerned with them
qua motives. Even if sense can be made of this reinterpretation, Hall’s thesis is rendered much
less interesting, to say the least.”).
137. See HALL, supra note 2, at 88 (“[I]f the above writer meant to assert that all the above
situations are alike except as regards the motives, in the usual sense, it can readily be shown that
he was mistaken. . . . If the deceased was advancing on the defendant with drawn knife, saying,
‘I’m going to kill you,’ and safe escape was impossible, it makes not the slightest difference
whether the defendant hated his assailant or whether the assailant was his son whom he loved
beyond measure.”).
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B. Evaluating the Truth of the Maxim’s Claim
Despite the array of crimes and defenses cited as examples of
138
motive’s relevance, most of these examples relate to intentions, not
motives. Although empirical criticisms of the maxim assert that
motive is relevant to both criminal offenses and defenses, one
approach to defending the maxim is to acknowledge motive’s
relevance to defenses while explaining why the maxim’s claim only
applies to criminal offenses.139 Although certain defenses intuitively
seem to challenge the maxim, a careful application of the proper
definition of motive reveals the maxim’s continued validity to all
crimes save a certain category of bias crimes, which are discussed in
Part III.B.3.
1. Criminal Offenses. In addition to mentioning criminal
defenses, critics have claimed that motives are relevant to certain
criminal offenses, such as specific intent crimes140 and inchoate
crimes,141 because these crimes turn on the reason for the defendant’s
142
action. This claim only follows, however, from an identification of
motive with ulterior intentions. Once motive is understood as
something altogether distinct from intentions, it is clear that motive is
irrelevant to specific intent crimes and inchoate crimes such as
criminal attempt. “In criminal attempts, the purpose to effect a

138. See infra Part III.B.1–2 for a discussion of specific intent crimes, inchoate crimes, selfdefense, necessity, and duress.
139. See Binder, supra note 3, at 48 (suggesting this approach). Used here, the term
“criminal defenses” refers to those affirmative defenses that negate criminal liability even when
the prosecutor establishes the elements of a criminal offense. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE
art. 2 (1962) (discussing principles of liability), with id. at art. 3 (discussing principles of
justification).
140. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 228 (describing the view that crimes such as
burglary—which require a mental state “beyond the defendant’s intent to do those acts or cause
those consequences” defined in the statute—make relevant the defendant’s motive for doing
those acts); Husak, supra note 13, at 8 (defining motive as “specific intentions”).
141. See Binder, supra note 3, at 48–49 (recounting, with approval, Walter Hitchler’s
argument that inchoate crimes, such as attempt and conspiracy, and partially inchoate crimes,
such as burglary and robbery, use the actor’s purpose in committing the act to transform a legal
act into a criminal one in the case of inchoate crimes, or a minor criminal offense into a serious
one in the case of partially inchoate crimes, and thus concluding that these crimes make motive
relevant).
142. See HUSAK, supra note 1, at 146 (“The reason why the defendant breaks and enters is
crucial in characterizing his conduct as a burglary. Forgery, kidnapping, criminal libel, and
conspiracy provide other examples, and the list could be expanded at great length.”); see also
supra notes 140–41.
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particular harm is not a motive; it is part of the plan, it implies
143
intention.” As long as the person intended to commit the crime, it
simply does not matter whether that person planned to do so for love
or for money.
The offense element of premeditation and deliberation provides
a more interesting example, because it does not turn on a specific
intention like criminal attempt does. As Professors Heidi M. Hurd
and Michael S. Moore adeptly explain, however, premeditation does
not turn on motive either:
To determine that a defendant premeditated and deliberated about
a killing simply requires a fact finder to find that the defendant
formed the purpose to kill and contemplated the means by which to
kill temporally in advance of the killing. In making this
determination, it may be evidentially valuable to discover that the
defendant hated the victim or had a motive to kill the victim, since if
he did, he may well have thought about killing the victim. But as a
matter of law, to find that a defendant premeditated and deliberated
about a killing does not require the fact finder to discover the
reasons for which the defendant intended to kill and deliberated
144
about its means . . . .
145

At least excluding bias crimes,
the irrelevance-of-motive
maxim thus appears to be true with regard to criminal offenses. That
is, bad motives are irrelevant. Professors Hurd and Moore reach this
conclusion, but admit that “there are clearly defense doctrines that
require courts to consider good, or at least exculpatory, motivations
as bases for reducing or altogether suspending penalties for prima
facie wrongdoing,” listing necessity, third-party self-defense, and the
146
provocation/passion doctrine. The same type of reasoning Hurd and
Moore invoke to dismiss the issue of premeditation, however, can
demonstrate the irrelevance of motive in these criminal defenses as
well.
2. Criminal Defenses. Some critics of the maxim argue that
although inculpatory motives may not be relevant to criminal

143. HALL, supra note 2, at 86.
144. Hurd & Moore, supra note 41, at 1120–21.
145. See infra Part III.B.3.
146. Hurd & Moore, supra note 41, at 1119–20.
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147
offenses, exculpatory motive are relevant to criminal defenses. In
response to these arguments, defenders of the maxim could attempt
to explain why only offenses should exclude motive. They could claim,
for example, that offenses establish objective standards void of moral
and political issues,148 “leaving a ‘technical’ core to the law.”149
Peripheral doctrines of an entirely different nature could then resolve
the inadequacies of this technical core, taking subjective differences,
morality, and political issues into account. Regardless of whether such
a distinction is defensible, it is unnecessary because motives are
irrelevant to criminal defenses as well.
Professor Jerome Hall explains motive’s irrelevance to the selfdefense doctrine: “If the deceased was advancing on the defendant
with drawn knife, saying, ‘I’m going to kill you,’ and safe escape was
impossible, it makes not the slightest difference whether the
defendant hated his assailant or whether the assailant was his son
150
whom he loved beyond measure.” As one court graphically put it:

One may harbor the most intense hatred toward another; he may
court an opportunity to take his life; may rejoice while he is
imbruing his hands in his heart’s blood; and yet, if, to save his own
life, the facts showed that he was fully justified in slaying his
151
adversary, his malice shall not be taken into the account.

Recall that the irrelevance-of-motive maxim merely asserts that
motives are not directly relevant.152 Even though “the solution of the
question—was it self-defense or an unnecessary killing?—is
sometimes aided by considering the motives of the accused,” this does
not imply that motives like “hatred or revenge supersede[] the
153
apparent necessity of the measures taken in self-defense.”
Just like the offense of burglary, the defenses of necessity and
154
duress relate to intention, not motive. These defenses only apply if

147. See id. at 1119 (objecting to bias crimes as breaking “new ground in the development of
criminal law doctrine” by making inculpatory motives relevant, even though exculpatory
motives are already relevant).
148. See generally ALAN NORRIE, PUNISHMENT, RESPONSIBILITY, AND JUSTICE: A
RELATIONAL CRITIQUE 142–93 (2000) (explaining, but ultimately rejecting, this view).
149. Id. at 192.
150. HALL, supra note 2, at 88.
151. Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527, 532 (1858).
152. See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text.
153. HALL, supra note 2, at 88.
154. See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.
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the prohibited act was committed “in order to avoid an unlawful
155
threat of harm from another person,” or, in the case of necessity,
avoid a greater harm.156 The doctrine of necessity protects inmates
who escaped from prison under the mistaken belief that their lives
157
were in danger, but it is of no assistance to prisoners who escaped in
ignorance of a real, life-threatening fire.158 This relevance of the
actor’s purposes raises an issue of ulterior intentions, not motives. As
long as the prisoner’s escape served the intention of “avoiding the
fire,” it matters not whether this intention was valuable for selfpreservation or for gluttony—if, for example, a death row inmate
cared about survival only as a means to allow the inmate to enjoy the
last meal.
None of these supposed examples of motive’s relevance pose a
problem for the irrelevance-of-motive maxim, properly construed.
This result is a predictable one. Because the proponents of the view
that motive is relevant define “motive” as some form of ulterior
intention, their examples relate to instances in which ulterior
intentions are relevant to criminal liability. Given that motive has
been shown to be altogether distinct from intention, however, these
examples say nothing of the relevance of motive.
One might criticize the foregoing method of analysis for
dismissing any offense or defense that can be described using
intention terms rather than motive terms. This approach, however, is
exactly what Professor Hall’s thesis calls for. “[T]he technique of
restating such cases in conformity with the principle of mens rea
[rather than motive] is to articulate the relevant criminal intention
and state the decision in terms of that. This, unfortunately, has not
always been done by the courts.”159 At least excluding bias crimes,
motivations are never directly relevant to criminal liability.
3. Bias Crimes. Although this Note takes no position as to the
ultimate issues in the bias crime debate, it seeks to reframe that
discussion by revealing the unique nature of bias crimes. Bias crime
155. HUSAK, supra note 1, at 146.
156. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 229.
157. Id. at 229 & n.19; see id. at 446 (“[I]f A kills B reasonably believing it to be necessary to
save C and D, he is not guilty of murder even though, unknown to A, C and D could have been
rescued without the necessity of killing B.”).
158. See id. at 446 (“If A kills his enemy B for revenge, and he later learns to his happy
surprise that by killing B he saved the lives of C and D, A has no defense to murder.”).
159. HALL, supra note 2, at 91–92.
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statutes are not, as some commentators have suggested, simply one
160
additional instance in which the criminal law considers motive. For
better or for worse, certain bias crimes represent a drastic doctrinal
161
departure from a longstanding maxim of criminal law. This Section
first identifies the subcategory of bias crimes that inculpate motives
and then discusses the empirical relevance of this subcategory.
Professor Frederick Lawrence has identified two “analytically
distinct” categories of bias crime statutes: the discriminatory selection
model and the racial animus model.162 “The discriminatory selection
model of bias crimes defines these crimes in terms of the
perpetrator’s discriminatory selection of his victim. Under this model,
it is irrelevant why an offender selected his victim on the bases of race
or group; it is sufficient that the offender did so.”163 Whether the
offender chose the victim on the basis of race is a question of
164
intentions. If the offender assaulted a black victim, the question is
whether the offender had the intention of assaulting “a black person”
or whether the offender merely intended to assault “a person.”
Motive is thus irrelevant to the discriminatory selection model of bias
crimes.
The racial animus model, however, “defines crimes on the basis
of the perpetrator’s animus for the racial or ethnic group of the victim
and the centrality of this animus in the perpetrator’s motivation for
165
committing the crime.” A statute would fall into the racial animus
model if it requires ill will, hatred, bias, or “some measure of hostility
toward the victim’s racial group and/or toward the victim because he
is part of that group.”166 Unlike every other crime considered thus far,
this type of bias crime statute does make motive qua motive relevant.
A hypothetical scenario shows that this model will distinguish, on the
basis of motive, between two defendants with identical intentions.
160. See Janine Young Kim, Hate Crime Law and the Limits of Inculpation, 84 NEB. L. REV.
846, 852–55 (2006) (citing examples of motive’s relevance).
161. See Hurd & Moore, supra note 41, at 1119 (2004) (objecting to hate crimes as breaking
“new ground in the development of criminal law doctrine”).
162. LAWRENCE, supra note 4, at 29–30 (1999). Regardless of whether the bias crime
provision constitutes a separate offense or merely creates a sentencing enhancement criterion, it
nevertheless becomes an “essential element of the offense.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 495 (2000).
163. LAWRENCE, supra note 4, at 30.
164. See Hurd & Moore, supra note 41, at 1124 (explaining how statutes that avoid
reference to hate or bias altogether are analogous to traditional specific intent crimes).
165. LAWRENCE, supra note 4, at 30.
166. Id. at 34–35.
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Imagine a person, Alan, with an unusual resistance to change—
whenever he chooses between alternatives that are otherwise equally
desirable, Alan likes to choose whichever option is more familiar.
Now meet Bob, an individual with a strong dislike for black people.
One day, both Alan and Bob participate in an identical sequence of
events. They both feel hungry and decide to seek out some money for
food. Having none, Bob and Alan both resolve to mug a stranger.
They each walk to a quiet street that has periodic passersby of both
white and black races. They both make a conscious choice to mug a
black victim, though for different reasons. Because Alan had only
committed one mugging before this time, and because his previous
victim happened to be black, Alan decides to choose another black
victim simply for the sake of consistency. Bob, however, chooses a
black victim because of his prejudice.
The two offenders committed the respective muggings with
identical intended consequences. They both intended to mug a black
person, obtain money from the victim, buy food, and eat food. What
differentiates the two is the reason why their intended consequence of
mugging a black person was valuable to them. Because both
offenders had the specific intention of mugging a person of a
particular race, the discriminatory selection model of bias crime laws
would treat both of these individuals as bias crime offenders. Under
the racial animus model, however, only Bob committed a bias crime.
This example demonstrates how under the racial animus model,
motive is directly relevant to bias crimes. This apparent contravention
of the irrelevance-of-motive maxim raises the question of how
common the racial animus model is. Although the racial animus
model has been identified as “the one that bias crime scholars and law
enforcement agencies most typically adopt,”167 it is hardly ever
enacted. For example, Professor Lawrence claims that Massachusetts
follows the racial animus model based on a statutory definition that
“[h]ate [c]rime[s]” are “any criminal act coupled with overt actions
motivated by bigotry and bias.”168 This statutory definition, however,
applies only to the collection and dissemination of hate crime data.169

167.
168.

Id. at 34 (footnote omitted).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22c, § 32 (1997), reprinted in FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE,
PUNISHING HATE app. C, at 191 (1999) (internal quotations omitted).
169. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22c, § 32–35 (2007) (applying the definitions in section 32
only to sections 33 through 35, which concern hate crime data).
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The state’s criminal law contains no such requirement. Racial
animus model statutes have been repealed in New Jersey171 and
Maryland172 in favor of discriminatory selection model versions.
Even when statutes do appear to enact the racial animus model,
judges can interpret them in a way that takes the bias out of “bias
crimes” by transforming them into discriminatory selection model
statutes. In State v. Stalder,173 the Supreme Court of Florida sought to
construe a bias crime statute narrowly, so that it only covered crimes
174
“committed because of prejudice.” By referencing prejudice in this
way, the court thus described a crime that invokes a defendant’s
motives.175 The court then defined a “bias-motivated crime” as “any
crime wherein the perpetrator intentionally selects the victim because
176
of the victim’s race, color, ethnicity, religion, or national origin.” In
so doing, the court stripped the motive element from the statute by
determining the existence of prejudice by reference to the
defendant’s intended consequences.
This type of judicial interpretation was foreseen by Sir James
Fitzjames Stephen, who explained how motive-laden terminology “is

170. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 39 (2007) (requiring an “intent to intimidate [the
victim] because of such person’s race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation”).
171. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (1994) (enhancing a sentence if “[t]he
defendant in committing the crime acted, at least in part, with ill will, hatred or bias toward, and
with a purpose to intimidate, an individual or group of individuals because of race, color,
religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity” (emphasis added)) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e)
(1999) (“The defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an
individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual
orientation or ethnicity.”), and Act of Jan. 11, 2002, ch. 443, 2001 N.J. ALS 443 (codified as N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:16-1 (2002)) (repealing § 2C:44-3(e) and creating a separate offense that
prohibits the commission of certain other crimes “with a purpose to intimidate an individual or
group of individuals because of race, color, religion, gender, handicap, sexual orientation, or
ethnicity”).
172. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 470A(b)(4)(ii)(2) (1996) (repealed 2002)
(requiring, in some cases, “evidence that exhibits animosity on the part of the person
committing the act against a person or group because of that person’s or group’s race, color,
religious beliefs, or national origin” (emphasis added)), with MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10304 (2007) (requiring only that property be destroyed because of another’s “race, color,
religious beliefs, or national origin”).
173. State v. Stalder, 630 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994).
174. Id. at 1076.
175. A bias crime statute that requires prejudice does invoke defendants’ motives, whereas a
statute would not invoke defendants’ motives if it merely required that the victim’s race,
ethnicity, etc. play a factor in the perpetrator’s selection of the victim . See supra notes 160–66
and accompanying text.
176. Stalder, 630 So. 2d at 1077 (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (1989)).
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177
always evaded by legal fictions.” Although bias crimes following the
racial animus model are still on the books,178 the relevant question is
whether such laws will take defendants’ motives into account, or
whether, as Stephen predicted, they will ultimately be understood in
terms of intentions.

CONCLUSION
Assuming that bias crimes do continue to involve motives qua
motives, the foregoing examination of the irrelevance-of-motive
maxim shows just how unique such crimes would be. Consider
Professors Hurd and Moore’s claim in their 2004 article that bias
crimes are breaking “new ground in the development of criminal law
doctrine.”179 Because they did not defend the irrelevance of motive
more generally,180 however, their important conclusion has already
been trivialized. Professor Janine Young Kim construes Hurd and
Moore’s argument as merely showing that bias crimes involve motives
in a slightly different way than the way in which other crimes involve
181
motives. This Note has reached the same conclusion regarding bias
crimes as Hurd and Moore did, but has presented it in a broader
context—demonstrating that racial animus model bias crimes are not
simply a new application of motive, but the single exception to a
longstanding maxim of criminal law. Although arguments can be
made that regardless of whether it is typical to take motives into
account, bias crimes should do so, the foregoing discussion
demonstrates the need for scholars to make such arguments if they
are to defend bias crime statutes. Bias crime statutes are not just
another variety of crime; they differ in a fundamental way from the
balance of the criminal law.
This conclusion about the uniqueness of bias crimes only follows
once the term “motive” is understood to refer to something distinct
from “intention.” Although critics of the irrelevance-of-motive

177. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 121. Stephen’s claim is discussed in more detail supra in the
text accompanying notes 44–45.
178. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(I)(f) (2007) (providing a sentence enhancement for
defendants who were “substantially motivated to commit the crime because of hostility towards
the victim’s religion, race, creed, sexual orientation, . . . national origin or sex”).
179. Hurd & Moore, supra note 41, at 1119.
180. See id. at 1120 (discussing examples in which exculpatory, but not inculpatory, motives
are relevant rather than defending the irrelevance-of-motive maxim in its entirety).
181. See Kim, supra note 160, at 852–55.
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maxim are correct that no context-independent, logical distinction
can be drawn between criminal intentions and more ultimate
intentions, this does not disprove the maxim. Rather, it demonstrates
the need to reject this conception of motive altogether in favor of any
plausible alternative. The alternative defended here is not only
plausible, it is in line with the view articulated by Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen in the nineteenth century, and is the very conception
defended by Professor Jerome Hall, the theorist to whom the
irrelevance-of-motive maxim is often attributed.182 Once what Hall
183
calls the “usual distinction between intention and motive” is
accepted, it appears that motives—with the possible exception of
motives in racial animus model bias crimes—are indeed irrelevant to
criminal liability.

182. See, e.g., Husak, supra note 13, at 4–6 (labeling the assertion that motive is irrelevant in
the criminal law “Hall’s thesis”).
183. HALL, supra note 2, at 86 (referring to the view he defends).

